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We have heard a lot about innovation in the public sector over recent years. 
How useful has this focus actually been for the efficiency and effectiveness of policy 
design, service delivery and indeed enhancing public value?  My talk today will 
consider some of the key dimensions of the innovation agenda, and how it does, and 
does not, relate to the public sector productivity challenge that we face in Australia’s 
distinctive federal system.  
I’ll consider: (a) the advantages and the disadvantages of attempts to articulate 
an innovation agenda within government derived from the significantly different risk 
environment found in the private sector, especially given the fact that government is 
the uncertainty and risk manager of last resort and must therefore act in a risk-averse 
manner in many key areas of responsibility, and (b) the disconnect between the 
advocacy of innovation in the public sector (as a ‘nice to have’ objective) and the 
major ‘need to have’ challenge of increasing public sector productivity over the long-
term as we grapple with the fiscal consequences of an ageing economy (it is not just 
the population that ages, but also our infrastructure and institutions).  
I will then consider what could be done to reduce that disconnect, specifically; 
• the productivity gains that stem from fostering a greater tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity in governments’ approach to information 
requirements (and hence the ICT costs necessary to support government) – 
especially given that tolerating uncertainty signals the existence of trust and 
reciprocity, and fosters greater self-reliance amongst those supported by 
government; 
                                                
1 Contact: mark.matthews@anu.edu.au  
 2 
• lessons from the HC Coombs Policy Forum’s experimental work carried 
out in partnership with a state government aimed at adapting the 
structured hypothesis testing methods used by the US security intelligence 
community as a faster and cheaper method for monitoring and evaluating 
government expenditure, analysing and calibrating information from 
multiple sources, and indeed as a way of designing policies themselves as 
hypothesis tests (which facilitates learning and waste reduction); 
• the more general advantages of balancing the current dominating 
emphasis on ‘evidence-based policymaking’ with ‘intelligence-based 
policymaking’ delivered by the use of these formal hypothesis-testing 
methods – an approach far better suited to making timely decisions under 
conditions of unavoidable uncertainty and ambiguity; 
The productivity 
challenge in the 
public sector 
I will start by stressing the importance of re-connecting innovation and 
productivity growth. On the basis of statistical analyses of past decades, the Treasury’s 
Intergenerational report assumes future annual average productivity growth of 1.6%. 
The public sector is roughly one-third of the economy.  These are major challenges 
for the public sector.  In order to head off some serious problems, a large chunk of the 
economy must increase its productivity in a steady way and by a significant amount.  
Yet, we can’t even measure the productivity of the public sector itself effectively at 
present.  What are the consequences if this rate of productivity growth does not 
eventuate? How well positioned are we to judge these consequences if we don’t have a 
good sense of past rates of public sector productivity growth and the relative 
importance of different drivers. Perhaps we need an old fashioned growth accounting 
framework for the public sector that relates outputs growth to the growth of different 
inputs and estimates the ‘residual’? 
Firstly, I want to take you briefly through a little intellectual history concerning 
the study and understanding of science, technology and innovation in the private 
sector.  This is important in order to explain the strengths and the weaknesses of the 
way in which the innovation agenda has recently been adopted in the public sector.   
The interest in innovation in the private sector originated, in part, in a 
reaction against the difficulties faced by neo-classical economics in explaining 
technological advance. If one assumes a world of perfect information and a state of 
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equilibrium in which markets are operating in a stable manner, then technological 
advances must be treated as externally originating deviations from these equilibrium 
conditions — processes of disruption to which the economic system must respond and 
adapt.  
The finding from the early growth accounting studies that long-run 
productivity growth had a large ‘residual’ element that could not be explained by 
increases in the standard factors of production (capital and labour, etc.) stimulated a 
large and productive line of investigation that eventually led to the ‘innovation studies’ 
work that is currently informing thinking on public sector innovation. As innovation 
studies has evolved it has moved away from economic theory and econometrics and 
toward more managerial approaches — with a particular (and useful) emphasis on 
documenting and understanding real practices in business. 
Inevitably, this emphasis on how businesses do innovation in practice leads to a 
focus on how firms accumulate and exploit proprietary knowledge and capabilities: 
how they seek to exploit intangible assets that their competitors do not have. The 
emphasis is on differences between firms’ capabilities — on how innovation drives 
markets in such a way that they are in continual evolution — rarely in states of 
equilibrium. It should be of little surprise that the management of uncertainty and risk 
feature strongly in this perspective on innovation. 
Bring back 
growth 
accounting – but 
relate it to the 
public sector? 
There has been a negative side effect for government from this pattern of 
evolution though. As work on ‘innovation’ has flourished and shifted from economics 
departments to business and management schools is has become a little too 
disconnected from our understanding of long-run productivity growth.   
In the old days a lot of attention was paid to relating R&D expenditure to 
productivity growth. This was helped by the availability of pretty good data on R&D. 
We still have pretty good data, however many researchers who study innovation 
nowadays stress that R&D is essentially an accounting and tax break-based concept 
that does not reflect actual industrial realities in many sectors. We hear much less 
about R&D than we used to and more about innovation.  One problem is that this 
shift in emphasis has weakened the link between measured productivity growth and 
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innovation – the link it asserted, the link makes intuitive sense, but we are actually 
rather poorly positioned nowadays to work out how future long-run productivity 
growth might behave – and to determine now it might react to efforts to simulate 
R&D and innovation investment.  
Another problem is the tendency to ignore the ‘inconvenient truth’ – for the 
R&D and innovation advocates at least – that large chunks of publicly funded 
research expenditure have little or nothing to do (directly at least) with the generation 
of innovation outcomes.  The so called ‘linear model’ that links R&D to commercial 
innovation (scientists invent – industry applies) may be widely debunked amongst 
most of the cognoscenti – but persists in government policy frameworks and the media 
in a zombie like manner – not properly alive but it won’t die. Zombies are not good 
for public policy.  
It is no surprise that some econometric analyses of the relationship between 
R&D and productivity growth in Australia have failed to find a statistically significant 
causal relationship – much of our R&D effort (e.g. public science) is quite legitimately 
about other things than productivity growth.  
That said, in my view we do need to re-connect our modern understanding of 
innovation with its genesis in growth accounting.  The use of a growth accounting 
framework in Treasury approaches to managing an ageing population, i.e. the three 
P’s of participation, population and productivity, is a clear signal of the importance of 
closing this loop. The point is that we must close this loop with a more realistic 
conception of what R&D and innovation are all about. 
By evolving in the manner in which it has, work on innovation studies now has 
the (largely unrealised) potential to converge with another stream of thinking in 
economics known as ‘Austrian’ or subjectivist economics. This stream of thinking is 
distinguished from neo-classical economics in some fundamental ways — and ways 
that are highly relevant to understanding public sector innovation.  
Rather than a world of quantitative uncertainty, the Austrian economic 
perspectives describe a human condition in which creativity is a necessary response to 
qualitative uncertainty (effectively ignorance) over what the future has in store — both 
good and bad. In some circumstances there are no probabilities to assign to future 
states of the world, but rather the necessity to act creatively in order to generate 
parameters that can be assigned probabilities (and hence managed ‘rationally’). The 
resulting competition is inherently a process of discovery and innovation. From this 
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standpoint, markets are inherently exploratory and innovative collective endeavours that 
operate via selection.  
If we think about markets in this more analytical way — as exploratory 
processes and selection mechanisms — then it is easier to understand their limitations 
and, hence, grasp why public sector innovation is so important in helping us to 
manage uncertainty. Markets can cope with risk (quantifiable likelihoods) but they 
cannot cope with uncertainty as easily.  
This is why governments spend vast amounts of taxpayers money on 
translating uncertainty into risk. Many scientific and technological inventions are 
driven by the fundamental human desire to transform ignorance into uncertainty and 
risk. There are whole rafts of imaging technologies (X-ray, ultrasound and magnetic 
resonance imaging, microscopes, particle accelerators, telescopes, seismic analysis, 
magnetic anomaly analysis, etc.) that provide us with data that we would not 
otherwise have access to (i.e. that translate ignorance into indications and likelihoods). 
Much scientific theory is concerned with translating ignorance into risk (i.e. the 
analysis of complex data sets in order to generate patterns of risk — such as crop 
planting strategies in the face of unpredictable weather patterns). In short, investments 
in scientific instrumentation and pattern recognition are, collectively, investments in 
translating ignorance into risk. We are very rarely certain of what is or may happen, 
particularly in complex situations such as human health, but we collectively prefer to 
have more information than less information to guide our decision-making. 
Risk and 
innovation 
The private sector has well established and understood mechanisms for 
managing the risks faced when investing in innovation. An ‘appetite for risk’ is a key 
component of corporate strategy and an influence on competitiveness. However, 
when it comes to fostering innovation in the public sector, it is unwise to attempt to 
simply transpose the private sector approach to managing the investment risks 
associated with innovation.  
The approach we worked on with the Australian National Audit Office was to 
attempt to formulate a less risk-averse perspective than currently exists. We sought to 
do this by developing a decision support framework and by trying to convince the 
auditors that if a department of agency followed these guidelines but things went 
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wrong  - then they would not be punished. That was the theory anyway.  This 
framework is presented in Exhibit 1. 
 
Source: ANAO (2009) Innovation in the Public Sector: Enabling better Performance, Driving New Directions. Australian National 
Audit Office Better Practice Guide. Canberra 
Governments are 
special when it 
comes to 
innovation & risk 
taking 
Governments are the uncertainty and risk managers of last resort and, 
nowadays, operate in a very different environment of transparency and accountability 
in which risk-taking of any kind can be problematic. Governments must also play the 
role of an ‘immune system’ and attempt to identify and pre-empt possible negative 
unintended consequences both to the nation’s economy, society and environment and 
international relationships and obligations. Consequently, the risk-reward relationship 
for the public sector varies significantly from that of the private sector. Therefore, it is 
imperative to recognise these differences in order to enhance the effectiveness of 
efforts to stimulate public sector innovation.  
A key difference between public sector innovation and private sector 
innovation is that market-based selection mechanisms play a different role in the 
innovation process. In the private sector, the litmus test for attempts at innovation is 
market success. Not all innovations prevail in the market, and indeed various other 
factors mean that the ‘best’ solutions may not become the dominant solutions. 
However, markets do enforce selection processes that tend to eliminate less 
competitive solutions. Competing firms therefore do their best to second-guess what 
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will prevail in the market, often applying vigorous structured decision-making 
processes (such as Stage-Gate methods) to weed out less promising concepts and 
solutions.  
However, in the final analysis it is the market, and the social and cultural 
preferences that are reflected in markets, that will decide which innovations succeed 
and which do not. The academic and policy literature on how these processes work 
(and do not work) is well developed and full of useful insights. These insights work 
backwards from market processes into the R&D and demonstration stages that drive 
new product introduction. They also work forwards into how market processes drive 
the incremental innovations that continue once new products have been introduced 
into the market place. 
In a public sector context, the relationship between innovation and markets (as 
selection mechanisms) is significantly different. As I’ve stressed before, governments 
deal with the uncertainties and risks that markets cannot handle. This requires 
innovations in what governments seek to do. But, crucially, governments cannot rely 
on market processes to play the critical ‘weed-out’ stage in the innovation process by 
eliminating solutions that do not align well with the preferences expressed in markets 
and encouraging those that do. Rather, governments need to try to mimic this aspect 
of the functionality of market-based selection processes without the recourse of relying 
on markets to actually carry out this selection process.  This requires that the public 
sector draw heavily upon external and internal expertise to weigh-up complex risks of 
generating negative externalities.  When there is no market-based ‘shortcut’ available 
the sheer weight of evidence that may need to be assessed poses major challenges, and 
raises important questions about whether ‘hierarchies of evidence’ are required to deal 
in a rational way with the sheer quantity and complexity of information available. 
The consequences of incorrectly judging what will and won’t work when seeking to 
innovate are disproportionately greater for this type of public sector innovation than 
for private sector innovation.  
Furthermore, when private sector innovation goes badly wrong (e.g. a new 
drug that has unforeseen and terrible side-effects) it is governments that bear the 
responsibility by virtue of their regulatory roles. This is why, in comparison to the 
private sector, public sector decision-making processes can appear cumbersome, risk-
averse and time-consuming. The unintended consequences of getting it wrong are far 
too severe to rely on the market to correct problems — as in the private sector. The 
far greater complexity of what governments do generates great uncertainty over what 
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to do in response to challenges. The extraordinarily damaging potential associated 
with unintended consequences necessitates robust risk-averse decision-making. 
Governments are indeed the uncertainty and risk managers of last resort. 
Unfortunately, I don’t see this dimension in the various surveys of public 
sector innovation now taking place.  Prodded on now by the OECD, these surveys 
collect lots of data – but data of uncertain purpose.  As many junior medical doctors 
are taught: only order blood tests if you have some hypotheses you want to test or 
standard protocols to follow that will influence the decisions you have to make.  In 
contrast, those various surveys are fishing nets with a strong process focus, with no 
obvious purpose beyond asserting the importance of innovation. 
The public sector 
innovation 
agenda risks 
irrelevance 
If we saw the public sector innovation agenda really pushing the boundaries of 
how governments act as the uncertainty and risk managers of last resort and 
contributing to demonstrated productivity growth I’d be unworried about this 
displacement issue.   
The worrying thing is that I don’t see this happening.  What I see is the 
concept of public sector innovation looking for problems, and innovation being 
banded about as an end it itself – with self proclaimed experts on ‘innovation’ busily 
touting for business (and taxpayers dollars). This new game is disturbingly 
disconnected from the reality of the nasty fast and nasty slow moving problems that 
governments must handle – and that nobody else can handle. 
Ideas and concepts have been adopted from the private sector in an attempt to 
frame an agenda able to address these challenges. Prototypes and experiments, 
incubators etc . 
I think the public sector innovation agenda started to wobble off its tracks 
precisely because it gained ‘critical mass’ and started to focus on innovation as a 
process. A process that needs surveying, a process that needs mapping etc. This 
process focus has been combined with the tendency to broaden the concept of what 
constitutes ‘innovation’ to such a scope that it means almost everything and hence 
loses its utility. Innovation has become an over-spun and over-hyped slogan.  
I have been particularly concerned at a tendency to avoid relating public 
sector innovation to uncertainty and risk management in the policy learning cycle – 
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despite my own efforts to frame things in this manner via my contribution to the 
Australian National Audit Office’s Better Practice Guide on this issue – as highlighted 
earlier.   
Developing a 
better tolerance 
for uncertainty 
and ambiguity 
The current dominant paradigm in public management is characterised by an 
intolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty. Although governments are the uncertainty 
and risk managers of last resort this aspect of governance sits rather uneasily against 
managerial systems and cultures that view ambiguity and uncertainty as dangers to be 
avoided.  Indeed, ambiguity and uncertainty are themselves viewed as risks. This 
stance is especially visible in ISO31000, which frames risk as uncertainty over the 
achievement of clearly specified objectives. 
In this paradigm, various important activities, including the manner in which 
output-outcome budgeting has been implemented favours precision: commitments to 
firm targets that cannot be fudged. The assumption is that a rather mechanistic stance 
enhances transparency and accountability and contributes to the legitimacy of 
governance.  
This mechanistic approach can restrict the ability to learn-by-doing, share 
insights amongst peers and generally experiment with better ways of governing. In 
such a context, the ‘experimentalist governance’ approach promoted by Charles Sabel 
at the University of Columbia is refreshing because it prioritises learning, sharing 
insights, ideas and experiences.  
A tolerance for ambiguity is central to experimental governance because it 
involves open-ended approaches characterised by learning under conditions of 
substantive uncertainty. Intended outcomes are broad, provisional and can be 
modified in the light of experience. Governance shifts from a command and control 
architecture to a distributed learning architecture. Effective public policy is not a 
matter of ‘getting things right’ ex ante, but rather establishing the conditions for 
learning-by-doing in an uncertain world in which objectives are rarely ‘right’ in the 
light of hindsight and unfolding, frequently unexpected, events and experiences. 
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Government as 
risk manager or 
government as 
uncertainty 
manager? 
Given these points, I think it would be more useful if the policy narrative 
shifted to a concern with how best to cope with uncertainty and ambiguity rather than 
risk per se. Risk is driven by the existence of uncertainty and ambiguity – and these 
are factors that rarely go away.  As I have stressed, governments are the uncertainty 
and risk managers of last resort, attempting to cope with levels of uncertainty and 
associated risk that business and markets cannot cope with.   
This means that simply adopting risk management methods developed in the 
private sector (a notable characteristic of the dominant ‘new’ public management 
paradigm) is not effective or especially helpful. Rather paradoxically then, whilst the 
private sector does have useful experience in defining and managing the appetite for 
risk necessary to innovate (the risk-reward relationship etc) this is not the aspect of 
private sector practice that has shaped approaches to risk in the public sector. 
Would fostering a greater tolerance for ambiguity, uncertainty and risk give us 
a productivity dividend?  
My Australian National University colleague Michael Smithson has usefully 
stressed that exhibiting a tolerance for uncertainty both signals and reinforces the 
importance of social capital.  If I signal that I am willing to tolerate uncertainty about 
what you are doing then I signal that I trust you.  This opens up a window for self-
empowerment and, potentially, innovation. 
As someone who works in partnership with a range of government officials in 
helping to try to address challenges myself and my colleagues in the HC Coombs 
Policy Forum are keen to explore ways of increasing the cost-effectiveness of what 
governments do. I am therefore especially interested in finding ways for government 
to eliminate wasted effort and therefore cost.  
My own past experiences in working closely with aerospace manufacturing 
business in the UK and to some extent the USA has left me with a lasting respect for 
the advantages of focusing attention on wasted work (scrap, excessive inventory, re-
work, warranty claims, customer litigation etc). This focus on the outputs that one 
does not want can be a useful framework for thinking about processes in government. 
Whilst the difficulties in measuring outputs makes in hard to measure productivity in 
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the public sector it is of course far easier to measure prevailing levels of wasted effort - 
and reductions over time in these wasted efforts. 
I suspect that if we were ever to transition to a governance paradigm in which 
a tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity was much stronger then we could eliminate 
vast swathes of cost to taxpayers. If we have a low tolerance for uncertainty and 
ambiguity then we lock ourselves into a cost-escalation spiral driven by attempts to 
reduce ambiguity - especially if big data and associated ICT costs are involved. In a 
manner similar to the arms race dynamic we have to spend more and more taxpayers 
funds to try to re-assure ourselves that we know what our stakeholders are doing. This 
stance reduces empowerment and fosters a passive, compliance oriented culture.  
This contrasts with the alternative of fostering a tolerance for uncertainty and 
ambiguity with the aim of breaking this cost-escalation cycle and, in so doing, 
encouraging self-reliance, innovation etc. The two contrasting dynamics are illustrated 
in the following two diagrams. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Matthews (2014) Innovation in governance: the productivity benefits of fostering a greater tolerance for uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Paper given at the ANZSOG workshop on ‘Twenty-first Century public management: the experimentalist alternative’. 
11-12 Feb. Crawford School of Public Policy. Available at: http://marklmatthews.com/recent-lectures-and-seminars/  
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It is, of course, essential to set clear transgression boundaries when being more 
tolerant of ambiguity and uncertainty (i.e. tests for identifying circumstances and 
behaviours for when I should stop trusting you). Of course, transgression boundaries 
can also be evolved by the general community and applied to government too – the 
principle is reciprocal. This pragmatic approach to accountability avoids excessive, 
and costly, transparency – hence marketing and PR budgets can be reduced. 
Re-thinking our 
reliance on 
evidence-based 
policymaking 
I now want to turn to another aspect of uncertainty and ambiguity – the extent 
to which our reliance on the concept of evidence-based policymaking is ‘fit for 
purpose’ when you work in the uncertainty and risk manager of last resort. 
The concept of evidence-based policymaking is currently in vogue in many 
OECD governments. That approach relies on the robust analyses of data and other 
information to assess policy challenges and the performance of government 
interventions. The extent to which evidence-based analyses are able to inform future 
policy interventions rests upon the combined impact of the rate of change in pertinent 
conditions together with the degree of uncertainty and risk faced over potential future 
states of the world. In general terms, the greater the combined impact of the rate of 
change in pertinent conditions together with the degree of uncertainty and risk the less 
useful, and indeed even dangerous, a reliance on evidence-based policymaking alone. 
I suggest that we would be wise to counter-balance the current emphasis on 
evidence-based policymaking with the concept of intelligence-based policymaking. 
Intelligence-based policymaking involves the adaptation of the structured competing 
hypothesis testing methods used in (US) intelligence tradecraft and ‘weak signals’ 
analysis for more general application in public policy.  
One advantage of intelligence-based policymaking is that it has been explicitly 
designed to handle decision-making under conditions of substantive uncertainty, 
ambiguity and risk – situations in which there may be no option to wait before more 
evidence is available before deciding what to do about a possible threat.  
Another advantage of intelligence-based policymaking is that it is better 
positioned to handle reflexive responses. If I release an evidence-based assessment of a 
particular policy challenge (e.g. in social policy or business regulation) it is likely that 
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the behavior of the actors and entities whose behaviors constitutes the policy challenge 
may change in response to their improved understanding of what government plans to 
do in the future. There are many examples of this. 
Given this reality, simply relying on evidence-based policy prescriptions to 
generate public value can be costly. The very release of the diagnosis of the problem(s) 
and intended solution(s) can, in effect, reduce the Net Present Value of the intervention.  
This is a familiar issue in intelligence tradecraft (e.g. counter-intelligence practice) 
whose broader significance for public policy is, arguably, under-valued. This aspect 
further reinforces the utility of intelligence-based policymaking as a counter-balance 
to the limitations and risks of evidence-based policymaking. 
The following diagram illustrates the principle that uncertainty over 
understanding both the future and past experiences should, perhaps, be treated as a 
‘U’ shaped curve that reaches its lowest point in the immediate past (lags in receiving 
and assessing information mean that there is always more uncertainty over the present 
than the immediate past). Although there is far greater uncertainty in regard to what 
the future may involve we can never be certain about our understanding of the lessons 
from experience to date.  All other things being equal we are more uncertain the 
further we go into the past. This is a constraint to the net present value of evidence-
based policymaking derived from historical data. 
 
 
Source: Author 
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We need better 
tools for coping 
with uncertainty, 
ambiguity and 
risk within 
government 
We have already started to make some progress in improving the cost-
effectiveness of handling uncertainty and ambiguity by developing and piloting a 
more parsimonious approach to evaluating government interventions based on the 
use of structured hypothesis testing techniques – expressed as conjectures and 
refutations in a short tabular format.  
This approach emerged from efforts to assist a state government in Australia 
to develop a cost-effective internal evaluation capacity that also significantly reduced 
the (often onerous) reporting burden on those being evaluated. 
This work has adapted methods widely used by the US national security 
community. In essence, these methods implement the scientific method (conjectures 
and refutations) but within the command and control systems characteristic of that 
arm of government. Structured hypothesis testing, especially when it uses competing 
hypotheses, is especially useful because it leaves room for uncertainty and risk as core 
challenges, rather than attempting to treat risk management as a compliance exercise. 
The approach is, of course, compatible with the ‘developmental evaluation’ approach 
that makes it both legitimate and desirable to address evolving objectives in the light 
of experience (an approach with is I understand from recent discussions at the OECD 
gaining in importance outside of Australia). 
Experience to date in pilot work carried out in partnership with government 
departments suggests that structured hypothesis-testing methods can significantly 
increase the speed and accuracy of two key governance activities: the analysis of 
evidence and monitoring & evaluation processes. As a result, a range of government 
departments and agencies in Australia are now expressing strong interest in the use 
and further development of this sort of approach. In situations where sufficient data 
are readily available, structured hypothesis testing can significantly reduce the cost of 
evaluations of government spending in comparison to conventional audit and 
narrative-based evaluation methods. Monitoring & evaluation findings are expressed 
in a tabular manner that does not require lengthy written explanation or rely on 
nuancing of phrases in the finalisation of conclusions. This format is illustrated in the 
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following fictional (and partial) version of a real but confidential evaluation 
framework. 
 
 
Source: Matthews (2014) Implementing experimental governance: Implications for the evaluation of industrial policy and for maximising 
learning from industrial practice. Presentation to the OECD Expert Group on the Evaluation of Industrial Policy. 16 
January. Paris. Available at: http://marklmatthews.com/recent-lectures-and-seminars/  
 
One of the major advantages of this succinct method is cost-effectiveness: it 
can eliminate swathes of ‘re-work’ in finalising often long reports as they journey up 
and down the government hierarchy on the winding road to completion and sign-off.  
Experience to date also indicates that the ability to ‘nest’ hypothesis tests in 
evaluation and review work may have some significant productivity advantages. 
Diagnostic nesting allows for more parsimonious approaches to be adopted by using 
the test of a high-level hypothesis to determine whether or not further diagnostic 
scrutiny of evidence on that issue is required.  This nesting is illustrated in the 
following diagram. 
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Source: Matthews & White (2013) Faster & smarter: using a hypothesis-testing methodology to reduce the time and cost of evaluations. 
Discussion Paper prepared for consideration by the OECD Expert Panel on the Evaluation of Industrial Policy. 
Available on request. 
 
The main challenge encountered to date in using this approach within 
government is when these diagnostic hypothesis tests need to rely on expert opinion 
rather than quantitative data (if this is not available). Some officials are uncomfortable 
if expert opinion is treated as a form of evidence. 
We are now moving on to pilot this more parsimonious approach as a means 
of designing government interventions explicitly as competing hypotheses and, also, as 
a means of identifying and managing risk in policy and program design.  This 
hypothesis-based approach is illustrated in the following diagram. 
 
Source: Source: Matthews & White (2013) Faster & smarter: using a hypothesis-testing methodology to reduce the time and cost of 
evaluations. Discussion Paper prepared for consideration by the OECD Expert Panel on the Evaluation of Industrial 
Policy. Available on request. 
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Interestingly, when I discuss these (fairly radical ideas) with senior government 
officials in Australia they tend to be well received because the productivity dividend is 
easily grasped and understood via the reduced re-work loop dimension.   
Framing this sort of approach against experimental governance, the issue that 
intrigues me is: can we find practical ways of fostering a greater tolerance for 
ambiguity in government that has the twin advantages of helping governments to be 
better at being the uncertainty and risk manager of last resort and also delivering a 
significant productivity dividend?  
My guiding proposition is that a greater tolerance for ambiguity can reduce 
the costs of seeking spurious precision in how intervention rationales and objectives 
are set, programs and designed and their efficacy assessed and communicated.  
Let’s stop side-
lining risk 
management 
A major problem with the current ‘risk averse’ paradigm in governance is that 
risk is approached as a distinct stage in project planning, a stage in which success is 
defined as demonstrating awareness of a set of well-defined risks and then putting in 
place risk mitigation tactics that reduce these risks to acceptable levels. This amounts 
to an approach that says in effect “I’ve dealt with the risks and we can now get on 
with delivering”.  There is little scope in this approach for continuously monitoring 
and reacting to emerging risks. Risk is a problem – not, as it is in the private sector, a 
source of competitive advantage.  Whilst businesses pay considerable attention to 
framing and managing their appetite for risk in order to innovate, vast swathes of the 
public sector seek, in effect, to have no appetite for risk at all (and of course in doing 
so they actually amplify risks). 
The final point I want to make is that operationalising effective risk and 
uncertainty aware learning cycles of the type alluded to here requires suitable 
monitoring and evaluation tools.  This requires risk management to be continuous 
discipline rather than a ‘tick the boxes and forget’ approach.   
In an uncertain and ambiguous world it is likely that setting up competing 
hypotheses over risks - hypotheses designed to identify emerging risk factors and to 
treat risk management not as a compliance exercise but as a creative tension and 
debate over risk can help us to get much better at coping with, and indeed benefiting 
from, risk.   
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The ability to access monitoring & evaluation tools that facilitate ‘failing early’ 
in experimental initiatives is important here – although that fail early capacity in turn 
raises important political considerations as the party-political blame game can be 
exacerbated. 
We therefore see great potential in developing an approach to risk 
management in public policy that is based upon the structured analysis competing 
hypotheses as a process of continuous monitoring. Such an approach has the potential 
to contribute to experimental governance because it provides a more cost-effective 
method for mutual learning and peer assessment based on establishing and exploiting 
creative tensions over uncertainty, risk and ambiguity – rather than assuming these 
things away by virtue of the way in which risk management is approached. 
Conclusions 
I now want to wrap things up by summarizing my main conclusions, framed as 
answers to the question: what do we have to do to keep the public sector innovation agenda on a 
useful, long-term and sustainable track – a track that yields a productivity dividend? 
Firstly, we need to do much more to re-connect the public sector innovation 
agenda to the challenge of sustained long-term productivity growth in the public 
sector. This is especially important in an ageing society. This objective also poses some 
pretty daunting challenges in regard to measuring changes in the output of the public 
sector in quality adjusted terms.  Some people say this is an old fashioned perspective. 
I suggest that we can’t afford to duck this challenge. 
To give you a specific example. The accuracy of the price indices used to 
measure real output growth, and therefore productivity growth, in the computer 
industry was significantly improved by the US official statisticians switching the 
emphasis from the (declining) cost of a computer (as a unit of hardware) to the far 
greater declines in the cost of a calculation – the ‘capital services’ provided by that 
computer.  In other words, the key was to switch from a capital good to a capital 
services perspective.  I see the potential for using this lesson to re-invigorate how 
service sector outputs are measured and used to estimate productivity growth. At 
present, there are major methodological challenges in measuring outputs in the 
service sector (of which government is part) because the only readily available output 
measures are input measures. Lawyers’ billable hours for example. We need to focus 
more strongly on the value of the services delivered to users – including the 
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uncertainty and risk management dimensions to those services. These quality-adjusred 
measures are known as ‘hedonic’ metrics. 
Secondly, we need to frame the public sector innovation agenda around 
governments’ distinctive role as the uncertainty and risk manager of last resort. The 
problem has been that the risk-averse manner in which the New Public Management 
ethos has been developed (risk is to be avoided rather than grasped) means that this 
opportunity has been missed. 
Thirdly, public sector innovation is a means to an end – not an end it itself. 
The panoply of e-government seeking to demonstrate ‘innovativeness’ by being visibly 
trendy is a concern. Twitter, blogs and the like may indeed be trendy, but they risk 
becoming a distraction to the core business of governments. Is this really useful – or is 
it just a fad that will disappear.  I suspect the latter. Where is the innovation in 
developing more effective committee structures, budget processes, legal and regulatory 
frameworks.  These are core functions of government that really could probably do 
with some innovation.  Following the path of least resistance (engagement via the new 
media) may be new, but is it particularly useful?  
Finally, we should recognize that a paradigm of escalating data acquisition, 
storage and analysis that signals low social capital (low trust and reciprocity) in 
relationships with stakeholders may be self-defeating. It locks us in to cost-escalation 
both directly (in ICT budgets) and indirectly in terms of stifling self-reliance amongst 
stakeholders. I find the idea of counter-balancing the dominating concept of evidence-
based policymaking with the (potentially) emerging area of (uncertainty-aware) 
intelligence based policymaking compelling because it may be a faster, cheaper and 
more ‘fit for purpose’ approach to formulating policy and learning-by-doing in 
delivering policy.  Put bluntly: a transition to intelligence-based policymaking may be 
the step change in public sector productivity that we are searching for – simply 
because it involves much lower levels of wasted person-hours within the public sector 
and lower risks of wasted spending on intervention designs and the monitoring & 
evaluation of this spending that does not align with the reality that governments are 
the uncertainty and risk managers of last resort. 
The emerging concept of intelligence-based policymaking may provide us with 
a basic roadmap for starting to re-design our business processes in the public sector to 
reduce costly re-work loops and the consequent ‘work-in-progress’ inventory of 
backlogged paperwork being re-worked – and that’s where the significant productivity 
dividend will lie. 
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The bottom line is that public sector innovation has to be about approaches 
able to generate cost savings over the long run – not spending more for bells and 
whistles and optional extras without fundamentally re-thinking the diagnostic, risk 
management, monitoring/evaluation and decision-making methods that are central to 
governance. 
 
 
